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Both Madame Bovary and The Man Who Loved Children explore the lives of 
women who suffer from intellectual and verbal poverty. Emma and Henny are 
unable to perceive the hollowness of the language of wisdom and significance to 
which Homais and Sam lay claim. Only Louisa comes to understand that the 
platitudinous language of her father is a vehicle of deception and 
self-aggrandizement, a perversion of true intellectual discourse. 
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Dickens's Phenomenological Reality 
One does not have to accept the phenomenological nature of all perceived 
reality—although I think I might—to recognize that the "reality" we experience 
in works of literature can be so described: "It is a commonplace of 
phenomenology that any given act of consciousness is a highly complex and 
highly structured synthesis of elements and 'forms' which, though they can be 
isolated for purposes of analysis, are given together inseparably in the united 
whole which is an actual act of consciousness. Elements of 'the imaginary,' of 'the 
fictive,' of 'the past,' of 'the historical,' of 'the cultural,' of 'the ideal,' surround 
and are inextricably given with any complete act of perception, not to mention 
the qualities of feeling, mood, volition, or emotion such an act may contain as 
well."1 So much so, in fact, that any thorough and sensitive reader or critic might 
respond to such formulations much as M. Jourdain took the news that he had 
been talking prose all his life. Or, as Merleau-Ponty says, get the impression 
"not so much of encountering a new philosophy as of recognizing what they had 
been waiting for."2 Such recognition has by now found a home even in the pages 
of PMLA.3 
Five recent interpretations of the reality in/of Dickens's fiction show the 
range and limits of this literary "reality."4 All five of these books, even Slater's, 
show how we could experience Dickens's writings, what forms our acts of 
consciousness toward them could take. 
'James M. Edie, "William James on the Structure of Experience," New Essays in Phenomenology (Chicago: 
Quadrangle Books, 1969), p. 235. 
2Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "What Is Phenomenology?" in European Literary Theory and Practice, ed. Vernon 
W. Gras (New York: Dell, 1973), p. 70. 
3See, for example, Thomas E. Lewis, "Notes Toward a Theory of the Referent," PMLA, 94 (May 1979), 
459-75. 
4Robert Newsom, Dickens on the Romantic Side of Familiar Things (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1977); Barry Westburg, The Confessional Fictions of Charles Dickens (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University 
Press, 1977); John Romano, Dickens and Reality (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978); Michael 
Slater, ed., Dickens on America and the Americans (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978); Michael Steig, 
Dickens and Phiz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978). 
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Michael Slater's Dickens on America and the Americans makes us ask how 
all-inclusive yet selectively referential our consciousness of a specific Dickens 
work or theme can allow itself to become—to the extent that we can control such 
consciousness or, at the least, give certain "elements and 'forms' " privilege. For 
Slater has enthusiastically gathered, with little evaluation, material from Martin 
Chuzzlewit, American Notes, Dickens's letters and speeches, and mid-nineteenth-
century pictorial images of die objects of Dickens's literary and extra-literary 
attention. The following comment illustrates both Slater's method and its 
limitations: "This is some of the most powerful writing in American Notes, but I 
have not included any of it in this anthology because it seems to me to transcend 
the matter of America altogether" ("Introduction," p. 28). Such exclusions limit 
Dickens on America and the Americans to biography and history, and on the most 
literal and documentary level. I hope it is not ungracious to label the pictorially 
handsome and diverting result as, in both the least and best senses, naïve. 
Slater's excerpts, most of which once existed within their own full literary text, 
have been exiled from it toward or into another arbitrary text centripetal, 
extrinsic, even irrelevant to that reality Dickens created for himself and his 
readers the only way he knew how, in the forms it took for him. 
Michael Steig's Dickens and Phiz, on the other hand, takes us constantly back 
into Dickens's reality. By narrating the close collaboration between author and 
illustrator and glossing the even closer interaction between illustration and text, 
Steig adds a genuine dimension to our experience of all Dickens's writings 
fortunate enough to have been "interpreted"—there can be no other word—by 
Phiz's iconographie skills and vision. Such interpretations earn their way into our 
consciousness of these writings by the illustrations' own interest and authority 
along with their relation to the writings. For as Steig shows in great and 
fascinating detail, "we find that the illustrator is at once collaborator, attempting 
to express the author's intention visually; interpreter, offering his own comments 
on the meaning of the work; and perhaps even an artist, sometimes creating 
independently valuable works of art. The paramount problem for readers of 
Dickens, a problem at once both aesthetic and interpretive, is how to 'read' the 
text and illustrations in conjunction with one another" (p. 3). Moreover, Steig 
rightly refuses to bind us to a narrow historicity, for "even if not a single 
Victorian reader recognized the complexities of the illustrations they are there, 
like the complexities of the texts" (p. 5). 
Even more prodigiously illustrated than Dickens on America and the Americans, 
Dickens and Phiz is also a guide to the shape of Hablot Browne's career and to 
early-nineteenth-century book illustration generally. But we are never too far 
removed from our direct experience of Dickens's reality, and Steig constantly 
turns our outer and inner eyes back toward it. There, with Steig's guidance, we 
may discover—as perhaps Dickens himself sometimes did—not only "an 
important fact to be dealt with in the illustration, which thereafter will become 
an integral part of the novel" (p. 171), "ideas which if stated baldly in the text 
would strike the reader as mawkish" (p. 119), and "thematic commentary by 
means of emblematic details, formal parallels between contiguous and scattered 
plates, character placement, physiognomy, and several kinds of external allusion" 
(p. 63); but even, and above all, "disturbing visual evidence of his text's 
implications" (p. 56). 
At First glance Barry Westburg like Steig and even Slater lays out the 
phenomenology of Dickens's "confessional fictions" diachronically in time from 
Oliver Twist through David Copperfield to Great Expectations. Robert Newsom and 
John Romano on the other hand, as we shall see, primarily examine Dickens's 
relation to "reality" synchronically in structural and epistemological space. All 
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three proceed toward Dickens's reality by way of an implicit or explicit 
mid-twentieth-century phenomenological reassessment of the nature of reality 
itself. Moreover, although each critic chooses to emphasize certain of Dickens's 
writings, together they bring most of the major novels into the argument and 
thus offer, taken together, a réévaluation of Dickens's total Fictional art and its 
modes5 of reality. 
If for Westburg Dickens's three confessional novels are synchronically "both 
the compulsive repetition and the strategic renewal of a single creative act" (p. 
xvi), nevertheless they form a diachronic "shift from representational, mimetic 
art of a kind of abstraction, an art of pure construction, an art of internal rather 
than external reference" (p. xvi). They become more self-consciously reflexive 
until "the artist's life is decomposed in favor of the activity of art itself" (p. xvii), 
and "Great Expectations confesses itself as a fiction about fiction-making, and in 
this sense it is self-critical" (p. xvii). At which point "Pip's life story," which some 
of us had still thought the novel was about, becomes "the pre-text for this final 
self-commentary" (p. xviii). By now we may wonder whether, as Newsom says of 
Hillis Miller, Westburg "overshoots his mark and, brilliantly, demystifies fiction 
itself (p. 13). For, to quote Newsom again, "we know Bkak House is a novel and 
that therefore its characters 'exist only in language.' But what we know is not 
necessarily the same as what we believe, and I suggest that most readers of the 
novel believe in its characters" (pp. 13-14). In the mean time, and granting that 
Westburg invites us to consider only certain of Dickens's novels and those only in 
a certain way, what does he have to offer? 
He identifies four themes: "time, growth, identity, and fiction" (pp. xviii, 1, 
et passim), "mutually implicated in self-conscious developmental narratives, in 
confessional fictions" (p. xviii). These four themes are central enough to any 
prose fiction to justify close scrutiny from whatever perspective: objective or 
subjective, empirical or phenomenological, old or new. The question then 
becomes whether the themes' "mutual implication" will allow us, from 
Westburg's "confessional" perspective, to retain the full possibility of the dialectic 
with other critical perspectives. The answer to this question must recognize, by 
our phenomenological premise, not only Westburg's own strategic emphases, but 
the context of previous Dickens criticism against which such emphases are 
weighted. 
As a "predevelopmental fiction" Oliver Twist is significant to Westburg first 
for what it is not: "emptiness" (p. 5), "no direction" (p. 6), "no temporal 
depth . . . not a Bildungsroman" (p. 11 ). Against these lacks can be set the 
novel's "providential myth" (p. 10) and, to Westburg more interesting, its 
intimations of a real if ambiguous "identity crisis" (p. 14) for its child hero at the 
hands of Fagin and its more direct illustration or symbolization through the 
thieves of many "problems of identity" (p. 19), above all "the concealments that 
language makes possible" (p. 22) and "the practice of guile" (p. 24). Confined in 
this novel to "the complex mental life of criminals" (p. 24), such 
"explorations—or, rather, constructions—paved die way for the psychological 
treatment of character in the developmental novels" (p. 24) and give at least the 
"rudiments" of a genuine "time-consciousness" (p. 28).6 
'Compare Howard Gardner's recent use of this term in The Quest for Mind (New York: Knopf, 1974), 
pp. 204-09. 
•In a fascinating appendix Westburg extends our consciousness of the novel to include history and 
biography by tracing Oliver Twist's "complex pattern of allusion to personages and events in 
seventeenth-century Parliamentary politics . . . which, in fact, leads us to discover the 
autobiographical-confessional dimension" (p. 193). This Joycean pattern also strikingly exemplifies "the 
uncanny" which, as we shall see, Newsom finds phenomenologicaUy characteristic of Dickensian reality. 
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All this, while convincing by its own terms, is almost antithetical to John 
Romano's version of the same novel. Nancy, for example, whom Westburg 
hardly mentions, Romano finds "the hero proper," so that "Pip shares the topoi 
of heroism not with Oliver but with Nancy: the change of heart, the self-discovery 
through self-sacrifice, the return to 'original nature' " (pp. 136-37). What for 
Westburg was Oliver Twist's nearly irrelevant "providential myth" (p. 10) Romano 
expands by "quasi-allegorical interpretations and interpretation by schema" (p. 
119) into the novel's central, objective, thematic "sentimental criticism of 
philosophy" (p. 128). Romano finds this "sentimentalism" as real as the identities 
Westburg discerns inhabiting the novel's underworld, if not more real, a moral 
strength that "has for its cause an unwillingness to trap or confine the real force 
of good, and that . . . can itself be honored as intelligent and realistic" (p. 
120). Where Westburg cites Erik Erikson, Norman O. Brown, and R. D. Laing, 
Romano cites Marx and Raymond Williams. Yet both, like Newsom, make 
considerable use of Steven Marcus, whose own writings on Oliver Twist as well as 
Westburg's and Romano's persuade us that the book's full phenomenological 
reality can contain both "a predevelopmental fiction" and "a novel of social evils" 
(p. 136), and no doubt also, if one wished to demonstrate it, a look at "the 
romantic side of familiar things." 
Not only is David Copperfield central to Westburg's confessional form of 
Dicken's reality, but Westburg's special approach is central to David Copperfield in 
a way it may not be to Oliver Twist or even Great Expectations. With Q. D. Leavis's 
chapter in Dickens the Novelist and Spilka's Dickens and Kafka, it restores the novel 
to the rank it held in earlier Dickens criticism, but with a fuller phenomenology 
of its subjective reality: subjective at once to its hero, its narrator, and its author. 
Even the novel's full original title, "Personal History, Adventures, Experience, 
and Observation," suggests to Westburg David Copperfield's major phenomenolog-
ical dimensions. In two long chapters Westburg takes us, as does the novel, from 
the self-recapture of repetitive memory toward the self-knowledge of 
nonnarcissistic education. Taking clues from such critics as Poulet, Lacan, 
Bachelard, and Sartre, Westburg looks closely at memories, mirrors, space, and 
language, to chart the major stages of David's journey. But neither David as hero 
or narrator nor even Dickens as novelist have reached that goal by the novel's 
compromised ending, in which the future fails David, whose story, unlike 
Dickens's, is over. With that ending David can journey existentially no further; 
by his choice of that particular ending, Westburg reminds us, Dickens begins to 
move beyond this fictional self to others. 
O'er leaping Esther's narrative in Bleak House and other indirect forms of 
"confession," Westburg completes his study with Great Expectations. How can I 
suggest, apparently paradoxically, that his confessional analysis, no matter how 
relevant, is less central to the phenomenology of this work? There can be no 
quarrel with Westburg's first argument, that "Pip is a creature of passage in a 
much fuller sense than David is, much more supple in change" (p. 115). His 
second argument, that "Great Expectations is confessional partly in that it 
dramatizes its author's imaginative development as a writer of narrative" (p. 117) 
is more problematic, and the problematic term is "dramatizes." Any late, great 
work of fiction will evidence or embody its author's development; but 
"dramatizes" proposes a degree of reflexive aesthetic allegory we may feel to be 
central neither to the genre of the novel nor to Dickens. Nor even to Great 
Expectations, confessional though it clearly is in other vivid and complex ways: 
formal, thematic, autobiographical, even cultural. Again it may help to recall 
Newsom's distinction between what we are quite genuinely persuaded to "know" 
and what we continue, nevertheless, to "believe." 
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I have nothing but the highest praise for Westburg's thoughtful, 
sophisticated presentation of Great Expectations' confessional form and that form's 
well-known thematic burdens—a total synthesis to the point of originality of the 
vast explicatory industry carried on over three decades of Dickens criticism. In 
this fourth chapter Westburg gives us this form and these burdens definitively. 
In his fifth chapter he turns partly away from Pip's much fuller, more supple 
passage to begin his second argument: "how Dickens has intensified his life-long 
explorations of the significance of art and the imagination" (p. 159), "what 
Dickens's most remarkable fiction has to tell us about itself (p. 160), while at the 
same time, significantly, carrying on with his previous concerns. For Westburg, 
Dickens tells Pip's progress with an art so artificial and abstract (his emphases) 
that it must "reveal the fictiveness of this assumption," "this structuralist, 
Bildungsroman logic, which traditionally shows good coming out of evil" (pp. 
167-68). 
However, paradox upon paradox, Dickens's persuasive portrayal of Pip's 
existential reality wins out, for this reader, over Westburg's brilliant exposition of 
its fictive artifice or perhaps, to be fair, by means of it. Pip's story, fuller and 
more meaningful than ever, remains in the center of Great Expectations, enriched 
by the full phenomenology of its confessional form. Westburg's short concluding 
chapter, which emphasizes that material in Great Expectations which indeed, for a 
moment, "supports the view that the work is at once ethically neutral, 
messageless about life, and yet still significant as an aesthetic confession, a 
confession about, and by means of, art" (p. 180), that "the Dickens narrative of 
time and growth is a confession about fiction-making itself (p. 185), even this 
forceful conclusion cannot displace Pip's human story from the novel's center. 
Which may be what Westburg really intended all along. 
As already suggested, Romano's "reality" and Newsom's "things" cover a 
wider phenomenological range than Westburg's "confessions." Moreover, they 
point our attention toward a Dicken sian reality more substantial both in itself 
and in its relation to the world's reality, but never naively so. For both critics also 
reject any strictly empirical, commonsense ontology for the "world" and question 
unqualified mimetic critical standards that derive from such an ontology, 
standards by which Dickens's "reality" was, in older, simpler times, found 
wanting. In fact, although neither book shows explicit awareness of the other, 
they move out, in different directions, from a common core of phenomenologi-
cal conviction about Dickens and, by implication, about reality. 
Romano's reading of Our Mutual Friend suggests to him that "for Dickens, all 
epistemologies are false epistemologies, by virtue of the mental act of imposing 
form upon reality in which they consist" (p. 46). Newsom, in turn, finds in Bleak 
House Freud's "uncanny," a "tension . . . between two quite different frames 
of reference, the commonsensical and rationalistic view of scientific skepticism on 
the one hand, and the primitive belief in the supernatural on the other" (p. 66). 
Both these propositions lead directly to Romano's conclusion that Dombey and 
Son, for example, evinces "another kind of relationship to reality in the novel, 
equal in importance to verisimilitude, and equal at least in its claims to the 
denomination of 'realism' " (p. 166), and also to Newsom's that "the multiple and 
divided selves of [Bleak House] are not simply the products of Dickens' 
pyrotechnic toying with uncanny effects, but the necessary effect of living in a 
world which is chiefly characterized by its repression and suppression of the 
past" (p. 92). B.oth critics, for similar and obvious reasons, engage Ian Watt in a 
vigorous critical debate. 
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Romano and Newsom found their respective studies on the close, very 
perceptive analysis of the phenomenology of a single novel: for Romano, Our 
Mutual Friend; for Newsom, Bleak House. But where Romano extends his 
discoveries helpfully to include other Dickens novels whose "reality" requires 
similar reassessment, Newsom expands his phenomenology of Bleak House to 
include its biographical and cultural significances and to hazard an hypothesis 
about the novel as a genre. Such expansions lie well within a great novel's 
legitimate phenomenological identity. Biographically "one encounters the same 
sort of insistent and ferocious, even if quite delicately veiled, resonsances and 
reverberations between the life and the book that we have seen operating in the 
book itself and that, to my mind, are essential to the experience of reading the 
book" (p. 97). Culturally Bleak House is both "a typically Victorian statement 
about the loss of faith" (p. 113) and, less typically, "one of the first examples we 
have of the late Victorian doctrine of the will to believe" (p. 116). Finally, and of 
importance to readers of any prose fiction, not just Dickens's, "to characterize 
the novel as an unstable, synthesizing genre" (p. 141), as Newsom's final chapter 
convincingly does, "very much changes the traditional shape of the history of the 
novel" (p. 142). Thus "the tension that is suggested by Dickens's phrase, 'the 
romantic side of familiar things,' and that, as we have seen, is embodied in a host 
of ways by his novel, is I believe the same tension—or family of tensions, 
perhaps—that is centrally organizing generally in the novel as a form" (p. 149), a 
tension that in Bleak House "is discovered to be deeply problematic" (p. 150). To 
conclude, "as long as novels maintain their capacity to amuse us with their play 
between the empirical and the fictional, they will retain the capacity deeply to 
unsettle us, for as long as reality is something that can be played with, it will 
remain, like all toys—no matter of how highly serious or educational a 
kind—something that can be broken" (p. 151).7 
Lauriat Lane, Jr. 
University of New Brunswick 
'Or, as Gerald Graff even more skeptically puts it, "the view of literature as the sovereign orderer of 
reality and our most valuable means of making sense of the world is strangely licensed by our view that 
reality is not susceptible to comprehension and management" (Literature Against Itself [Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1979], p. 7). 
The Triumph of Parody and Pun over 
San-Antonio's Literary Aspirations 
For over thirty years the novels of San-Antonio have entertained French 
men and women and have made him France's most popular writer of detective 
stories. The most conspicuous qualities of San-Antonio's novels are plot and 
language; plots distinguished by their imaginative, often inspired, complications, 
coincidences and melodramatic surprises, and a virtuosity of language which has 
few rivals in all of French literature. The basic linguistic technique employed by 
San-Antonio is the pun, but he also exploits other verbal manipulations such as 
the mixture of classic French, popular language and slang, the use of foreign 
words, malapropisms, unexpected similes, and the creation of colorful new 
expressions. 
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